SOME experts writing about international developments come to the conclusion that multipolarity has emerged sooner than many were ready for it. The speed of change is so high that even the boldest forecasts often materialize in real time.
President Vladimir Putin said at the plenary session of the 22nd annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in October 2025 that “multipolarity has in fact already emerged.” The pillars of a polycentric world are already in place, but the structure itself remains flexible. There are several independent centres where systemically significant decisions are made. The most important of these are the United States, China and Russia. India is developing its overall capacity. Brazil, Indonesia, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and several other major countries are strengthening their international standing, and their influence is acquiring a transregional scope. Continental Europe has placed its bets on fighting Russia, and as a result, it is losing its chance to be independent in global affairs.
The increasing Western pressure has faced all independent states with a choice between staying on course towards sovereignization and consolidation, and becoming the territory of the external forces’ “game” and settlement of scores. The unique geopolitical community of SouthEast Asian nations is facing this dilemma as well.
South-East Asia
Southeast Asia is a diverse region with a complex cultural and religious landscape. There are four major language families and three world religions here. Ancestral religious practices, such as the cult of ancestors, spirits defending communities, and animism, intertwined and became woven into the fabric of external religious systems and other cultures, including the Chinese Confucian, Indian Buddhist, and Arab Muslim cultures. This offered people a broader vision and promoted tolerance towards people of other faiths and persuasions. A distinct identity gradually took shape. Instead of replacing and erasing the traditional views people held there, it supplemented and enriched them.
South-East Asia presents a patchwork of state systems, including elective and hereditary monarchies.
During the colonial period, five powers carved up SouthEast Asia, preventing it from developing a common identity across this space and a feeling of belonging together.
At first sight, bringing all these different states within a single community should have been a major challenge. However, as aptly noted by Russian scholars, “despite all the differences setting Southeast Asian countries apart from one another, anyone travelling there cannot fail to notice their common denominator, which includes their everyday lives, their social networks, including patron-client relationships, the role of the family, mutual assistance within groups, and collective decision-making, as well as art and behavioural culture.” Recognizing a South-East Asian in a crowd of foreigners is just as easy as spotting a Russian.
ASEAN as the political and economic linchpin of SouthEast Asia
The region’s intellectual elites constructed a pan-regional identity consciously, taking into account existing differences and aiming to create a foundation for joint development and resistance to external challenges.
This latter aspect resonates with the thesis of Arnold Toynbee, a pioneer of the civilizational approach to historical study, who posited that civilizations emerge in response to historical challenges. Indeed, the events of the Cold War provided impetus for the political and economic consolidation of South-East Asia. Unwilling to be drawn into the rivalry of superpowers, Indonesia and Burma (now Myanmar) were among the initiators of the 1955 Bandung Conference, which paved the way for the Non-Aligned Movement. The necessity of survival in a bipolar confrontation spurred the realization of the importance of pooling resources within a regional framework. Thus, the idea of establishing the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, was born.
The philosophical foundation of cooperation within the Association was the concept of Asian values. These values include the rejection of extreme individualism, respect for leadership, the elevated role of the family, thrift, diligence, and teamwork. The state’s key function is to ensure stability, while the primary goal of economic modernization is to improve the welfare of the population. These non-confrontational approaches align closely with Russian political and societal mentality.
After the Cold War, the ruling circles of ASEAN nations faced the challenge of preserving their geopolitical identity. This served as a catalyst for enhancing the community’s resilience, which was impossible without establishing common principles of interaction within ASEAN. Over time, the Association’s hallmark became its rules of coexistence, which include decision-making by consensus, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, the use of informal dialogue channels to resolve disputes, and shared responsibility for regional issues. A distinctive format of discussions emerged – the ASEAN Way – devoid of protocol formalities and binding decisions, instead fostering gradual alignment on a wide range of developmental and security issues. Terms such as the “ASEAN Spirit” and the “ASEAN Path” entered the lexicon. Local experts argue that this pragmatic approach has been instrumental in overcoming challenges and achieving solidarity.
It is pertinent to address the related question of how regional strategists envision the emerging world order. Looking ahead, some South-East Asian experts lean towards a triumvirate model – a tri-polar construct where Russia, China, and the United States would serve as the central powers. This scenario is met with apprehension by regional political analysts, who warn that such an arrangement of interstate relations could be inherently confrontational, potentially spurring the formation of competing alliances.
Expanding on this theme, analysts conclude that in a context where major powers fail to agree on how to uphold the stability of the international system, “middle powers – those with sufficient economic and financial firepower – may be candidates to take over the role of great powers. And middle powers that are not on the front lines of great rivalries.” It is posited that these middle states will create a safety net of cooperation to shield the world from geopolitical upheavals. This thesis resonates at the official level as well. Reflecting on the transition to a “post-American multipolar world order,” Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong emphasized the growing significance of small and medium-sized states and implied that the aggressive tariff policies of the United States under Donald Trump had spurred ASEAN leaders to reinforce the Association’s unity more vigorously.
Allow us to express the view that, in a multipolar world, the most effective way for small and medium-sized states to advance their external interests is through a unified centre of power. In this regard, SouthEast Asian nations can rely on ASEAN. The Association exemplifies a geopolitical community of countries and peoples coexisting in a shared space and united by developmental interests. Despite the inevitable disagreements within this “big family”, it strives to act as a subject of world politics on the international stage, recognizing the imperative of consolidation to counter both external and internal challenges.
From past problems to new challenges
ASEAN is once again facing serious challenges, many of which stem from long-term trends that we had long forecast. The multipolar world order that is taking shape right before our eyes is being rejected by countries accustomed to thinking in terms of global dominance and neocolonialism, and they are making deliberate attempts to contain their geopolitical competitors and limit their growth opportunities by pushing them out of global and regional markets and exerting pressure on them.
Such behaviour has become systemic and echoes in developments across the world, including Southeast Asia. We can see how certain external forces are now trying to reshape the region to serve their own interests, with the aim of weakening China and sideline Russia.
In practice, this policy is being implemented through attempts to divide ASEAN and fragment it militarily and politically. Efforts are being made to draw some member states into limited-format arrangements to work on the agenda of deterrence rather than regional security. In place of ASEAN’s established inclusive mechanisms, selective alliances such as AUKUS, the Quad, and various groups of three or four countries are being promoted. All of this creates risks for ASEAN’s role as the geopolitical backbone of the region and, in the longer term and under unfavourable developments, could even threaten the emergence of Southeast Asia as a centre of power in the new global system.
The deployment of US intermediate-range missile systems and large-scale military exercises in the region are a serious destabilizing factor. Additional tensions are fuelled by NATO’s claims to a leading role far beyond its area of responsibility. The NATO summit in Madrid in 2022 declared “cooperative security” in the Euro-Atlantic and in what they refer to as the Indo-Pacific region. The alliance is using this disingenuous slogan to expand into South-East and North-East Asia thus increasing the potential for conflict in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the East China Sea, as well as on the Korean Peninsula.
ASEAN also remains under significant political pressure from the West over the Ukraine crisis. Since 2022, persistent efforts have been made to persuade it to take a side on this issue. Most ASEAN members, however, have maintained friendly or neutral positions and do not participate in anti-Russia geopolitical gamesmanship.
Unscrupulous external actors view South-East Asia as a strategic region that, if properly controlled, could provide significant advantages amid intensifying competition for global economic and technological leadership. Instead, all parties should be working to build equal and mutually beneficial partnerships with ASEAN countries, which is precisely the approach pursued by Russian diplomacy.
In addition to external challenges, ASEAN faces internal ones as well. The domestic political situation in Myanmar is one such challenge that attracts attention. The Association has established the position of Special Envoy for Myanmar. There is also ASEAN’s Five-Point Statement of 2021. Much has been done to address the issue during Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN chairmanship. Some local analysts caution against excessive reliance on the region’s own efforts to resolve conflicts, suggesting instead that such matters be referred to the United Nations.
We cannot agree with such an approach, because the role of the UN in addressing domestic political issues is, at the very least, highly questionable. Moreover, the posts of the relevant UN Secretary-General’s special representatives are, as a rule, taken by Western nationals or individuals with dual citizenship (one of which is Western). In an era of regionalisation of world politics, civilizational communities must be capable of independently finding workable solutions to conflicts within their respective spheres. In this regard, we can only welcome ASEAN’s desire to address the crisis around Myanmar without external diktat on the basis of constructive dialogue with that country’s authorities.
Another necessary attribute of a civilization aspiring to the status of a pole in a multipolar world is the ability to maintain inter-civilizational contacts. ASEAN has mastered this instrument well. A system of dialogue formats has formed around the Association, with the East Asia summits serving as its core. Direct contacts with influential regional organizations are expanding. Relations have been established with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. For us, it is important that ASEAN-SCO cooperation is viewed by South-East Asian experts through the prism of building bridges between ASEAN and the integration associations from continental Eurasia.
ASEAN places great emphasis on strengthening ties with BRICS. One member of the Association − Indonesia − is a full participant, while Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia hold partner status. Analysts in South-East Asia note that, as intensifying US-China differences narrow ASEAN’s room for neutrality, BRICS helps it avoid being caught between a rock and a hard place. Strengthening the fabric of inter-civilizational contacts is undoubtedly a key element in the process of building a polycentric world.
Russia and South-East Asia
Our country and the states of South-East Asia share a rich history of bilateral cooperation. This includes the visit of the King of Siam to Saint Petersburg in the late 19th century, the Soviet Union’s large-scale assistance to the national liberation movements of Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia in the second half of the 20th century, the construction of major industrial facilities across South-East Asia, and the creation of entirely new economic sectors in some of its states.
In 2005, over 20 years ago, the first Russia-ASEAN summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, elevating our dialogue to a fundamentally new level and cementing its comprehensive nature. In 2018, the partnership was officially granted strategic status.
Today, Russia remains a reliable friend to the countries of SouthEast Asia. Our relations are unburdened by either a colonial past or long-standing disagreements. Our country is perceived not only as a centre of power but also as a time-tested provider of security: energy security through projects in the hydrocarbon, hydropower, and nuclear sectors; food security through agricultural supplies; information security through the provision of information and communications technology solutions; and physical security through military-technical cooperation. This list, of course, is far from exhaustive.
Russia, in turn, views ASEAN as a like-minded partner, united by a shared commitment to broad international cooperation grounded in the UN Charter in its entirety and interrelated integrity.
For our part, we are committed to preserving an ASEAN-centric security architecture in SouthEast Asia. In this context, we view the Association as a partner in implementing the initiative to create a Eurasian security architecture, put forward by the Russian President in 2024. A constructive bilateral political dialogue on this topic has been established with virtually all ASEAN countries, and representatives of individual member states participated in the 3rd Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security (28-29 October 2025), organized by our Belarusian friends.
Viewing the Association as an integral part of Greater Eurasia, Russia is open to cooperation with ASEAN in the interests of resolving and preventing regional conflicts and ensuring comprehensive protection of national and regional security.
(Views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author).
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